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Stephen B. Cohen, Georgetown Law School, sbclawprof@aol.com,
202-352-8244, from The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, edited by
Prof. Scott Dodson (2015)

On the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia thenJudge Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored an opinion with profound
implications not only for the law of taxation but also for the role of
courts in ending racial discrimination in education. The case, Wright v.
Regan, 1 involved the dramatic intersection of the income tax law and
equal protection obligations of federal authorities under the
Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The precise
technical legal issue before her was procedural—whether parents of
black schoolchildren had standing to challenge the grant of federal
tax-exempt status to racially segregated private schools—but it was
hardly arcane or narrow. 2 In affirming that standing existed and
reversing the contrary decision of the District Court below, Judge
Ginsburg opined that the tax benefits of exempt status constituted
significant financial assistance and that the provision of such
1

656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1983).
On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg’s Supreme Court opinions concerning taxation have
generally involved arcane and narrow procedural issues to the exclusion of the substantive
problems generally occupying both academic and practicing tax lawyers. Her thirteen opinions,
listed alphabetically, include: Ballard v. C.I.R., 544 U.S. 40 (2005); Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S.
197 (2005); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004); Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999);
Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Levin v. Commerce
Ene., Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010); Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998); NFIB v.
Sibelius, 567 U.S. 1 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring & dissenting); N.W. Airlines, Inc. v. Cnty. of
Kent, 510 U.S. 355 (1994); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995); United
States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95
(2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2
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assistance to racially segregated private schools—so-called “seg
academies”—violated equal protection obligations imposed by the
Constitution.
Judge Ginsburg’s decision was unfortunately reversed on
appeal by a divided Supreme Court, which ruled that the plaintiffs did
not have standing because they lacked a sufficiently concrete interest
in the outcome of the litigation. She nevertheless provided a
persuasive and coherent defense of the right of victims of racial
discrimination in education to seek redress in the courts, and strong
dissents from Justices Brennan and Stevens (joined by Justice
Blackmun) supported her position. She thus created a benchmark
that future Supreme Courts may use to revise a Supreme Court
majority decision that appears, at least to this observer, as
fundamentally wrong and fundamentally flawed. Her opinion in Wright
also offers ways of understanding the later development of
educational equal protection doctrine, including Ginsburg’s seminal
decision in the Virginia Military Institute case.
This essay recounts the historical, political, and legal context in
which Judge Ginsburg’s ruling in the Wright case arose. This context
explains the importance of her decision to the battle against
segregated education and highlights as well the repeated efforts of
powerful political forces, including the Reagan administration and
congressional conservatives, to cripple efforts to prohibit racially
discriminatory private schools from receiving federal subsidies
through the tax system. This essay also aims to highlight Wright’s
place in the modern doctrine of educational discrimination.
I. “Seg Academies” and Tax-Exempt Status
2

A. The Importance of Tax-Exempt Status
For over a century, Congress has provided tax-exempt status
to private schools that operate on a "not for profit" basis. The
corporation income tax of 1894 specifically excluded from its
coverage a broad array of nonprofit organizations, including
educational institutions. 3 In 1917, the individual income tax (enacted
in 1913) was amended to give an additional advantage to a narrower
class of nonprofit entities—primarily schools, churches, hospitals, and
organizations for relief of the poor—by permitting their donors to
deduct

charitable

contributions.

4

In

later

years,

nonprofit

organizations were also permitted to abstain from paying social
security and unemployment taxes. 5
The conflict over tax exemptions for segregated private schools
first emerged after the 1954 Supreme Court holding in Brown v.
Board

of

Education

that

public

school

segregation

is

unconstitutional. 6 Segregation academies, private schools formed to
avoid the mandate of Brown, sought and received federal tax-exempt
status. 7 Civil rights groups sued to prevent these schools from
receiving federal tax benefits. 8

3 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. The exemption was reenacted in the
Corporation Income Tax of 1909, Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112, and in the
Revenue Act of 1913, Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G), 38 Stat. 172. The current version is
I.R.C. § 501(c).
4 This tax allowance originated with a floor amendment to the Revenue Act of 1917. 55 Cong.
Rec. 6728 (1917) (remarks of Sen. Hollis). The current version is I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3).
5 I.R.C. §§ 3121(k), 3306(c)(8).
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7 See generally D. Nevin & R. Bills, The Schools that Fear Built (1976); Terjen, Close-up on
Segregation Academies, NEW SOUTH, Fall 1972, at 50.
8 See Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools,
93 HARV. L. REV. 378 (1979).
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Throughout the controversy, segregated private schools fought
hard to retain exempt status. 9 Yet most of these schools lacked net
income, because receipts are generally more than offset by expenses.
While the exemption does confer immunity from social security and
unemployment taxes, this benefit was not usually cited as
important. 10 According to the IRS, the primary reason for seeking
exempt status was so that gifts to a school can be deducted as
charitable donations. 11
The deduction of claimed contributions, however, is proper only
if the payments are truly charitable donations and are not made in
payment for educational services. If the payment is required, explicitly
or informally, as a condition of a student's enrollment, then its formal
designation as a "contribution" is not controlling; the payment is
treated as tuition and nondeductible.

12

In general, courts have

regarded whether such a payment is "voluntary" and without
"expectation of commensurate benefit" as a matter of subjective
intent and have stated that the determination of intent depends on the
facts and circumstances of each particular case. 13
In 1979, however, the IRS announced a new objective test for
charitable contributions to private schools in Revenue Ruling 79-99,14

9

See generally Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure Affecting Tax-Exemption of Private Schools:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter “Implementation Hearings”].
10 See Nevin & Bills, supra note 7, at 15. Payroll taxes, however, were the focus of the litigation in
Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1980), and Goldsboro
Christian Schools, Inc, v. United States, No. 80-1473, at 2 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1981).
11 See Implementation Hearings, supra note 9, at 254 (statement of Jerome Kurtz).
12 See B. BITTKER & L. LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 35.1.3 (2013).
13 See id.
14 1979-1 C.B. 108.
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based on a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. 15 To the
extent that the value of educational services to the donor's children
exceeded designated tuition, a contribution was to be treated as nondeductible. The new revenue ruling was protested by the entire
private school community, which complained about the automatic
disqualification of parents as donors to the extent that the real costs
of educating their children exceeded tuition. 16
In December 1980 the Treasury told Congress that secular and
sectarian private schools had agreed on a compromise that would
supersede Revenue Ruling 79-99. 17 The compromise accepted the
subjective standard, but then set forth objective criteria from which
subjective intent could be more easily inferred. Certain enumerated
factors, alone or in combination, would imply that the contribution was
made "in expectation of obtaining educational benefits" for the donor
and therefore was not deductible: for example, the denial of
admission to children of taxpayers who do not contribute; or the
absence of a significant tuition in a school that places unusual
pressure on parents to contribute. 18
At the time, this controversy over disguised tuition was not
connected with the ongoing conflict over exemptions for private
schools that discriminate. Yet the segregated private schools (unlike
most other private institutions) strongly opposed the compromise
reached between the IRS and most other private institutions. Their
15

Oppewal v. Comm’r, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972). Oppewal was followed in Haak v. United
States, 451 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
16 A description of the controversy can be found in 126 Cong. Rec. S16, at 228-36 (Dec. 11,
1980).
17 See id. at 231-34.
18 Id. at 233-34.
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opposition suggests that they benefited significantly, not only from
bona fide donations, but also from charitable deductions taken for
disguised tuition. 19 Thus, the ability of parents to deduct disguised
tuition may have been the critical advantage of exempt status for
segregated schools, perhaps as or even more important than the
deduction for bona fide charitable donations.
B. The Green Principle: Denying Tax-Exempt Status to
Racially Segregated Private Schools
Not until 1970 under the pressure of litigation instituted by civil
rights groups, did the IRS accept the principle that racially segregated
schools may not lawfully receive tax-exempt status. 20 In 1969 the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights filed Green v. Kennedy, an action
on behalf of black schoolchildren in Mississippi, challenging the
constitutionality under the equal protection clause of the grant of tax
exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools. 21 Because of
the claim that a federal statute was being applied in violation of the
Constitution, a three-judge federal court was convened. 22 On January
12, 1970, the court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the IRS to

19

Id. at 228-31.
Until 1965, exempt status was routinely granted to private schools without regard to practices
of racial discrimination. In the mid-1960s, however, the IRS decided to re-examine this policy in
the light of Brown v. Board of Education and later Supreme Court decisions invalidating state aid
to segregated private schools. From October 15, 1965, to August 2, 1967, a freeze was
maintained on applications for exempt status "filed by private schools apparently found to be
operated on a segregated basis." Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1970). In
1967, after an internal review, the IRS concluded that it lacked authority to withhold exemptions
except where the school already received other substantial state assistance, such as tuition
grants or the use of public facilities. IRS News Release, Aug. 2, 1967, reprinted in 1967 Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6734.
21 The named defendant, David Kennedy, was Secretary of the Treasury. After he was replaced
by John Connally, the case was retitled Green v. Connally and is commonly referred to by that
name.
22 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1976).
20
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withhold exemptions from segregated schools in Mississippi. 23 In July
1970, the IRS announced a policy of denying exempt status to all
segregated private schools nationwide. 24 One year later the Green
court issued a final opinion interpreting the Internal Revenue Code as
not granting exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools.25
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Harold Leventhal gave
three reasons for this conclusion. First, under the common law, an
organization whose activities are illegal or contrary to public policy is
not entitled to privileges and immunities ordinarily afforded to
charities. 26 If Fagin's school for pickpockets could not qualify as a
charitable trust, then neither should a segregated private school. 27
Thus, "if we were to follow the common law approach," the Code
would be interpreted to deny exempt status in such cases. 28 Second,
the Internal Revenue Code "must be construed and applied in
consonance with the Federal public policy against support for racial
segregation of schools, public or private." 29 The numerous "sources
and evidences of that Federal public policy" included the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments, Brown and its progeny, and the 1964
Civil Rights Act.30 Third, any other construction "would raise serious
constitutional questions" and "it would be difficult indeed to establish

23

Green, 309 F. Supp. 1127.
IRS News Releases, July 10 and July 19, 1970, reprinted in 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶¶
6790, 6814 (1970).
25 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
26 Id. at 1157-59.
27 Id. at 1160.
28 Id. at 1161.
29 Id. at 1163.
30 Id.
24
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that such [tax] support can be provided consistently with the
Constitution." 31
In addition, a permanent injunction was issued against the
government, even though the IRS had acquiesced in the preliminary
order, 32 because of the need to prevent future administrations from
changing course:

The July 1970 [IRS] Press Release does not indicate
whether the new construction is considered mandatory or
merely within the sound discretion available to the IRS in
construction of the Code. If defendants' construction were
discretionary, it could be changed in the future. We think
plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of relief on an
enduring, permanent basis, not on a basis that could be
withdrawn with a shift in the tides of administration, or
changing perceptions of sound discretion. 33

The injunction applied only to Mississippi because, under
equitable principles, such relief had to be limited to the plaintiffs
before the court. However, Judge Leventhal emphasized that,
notwithstanding the restricted geographical scope of his order, the
legal principle enunciated in construction of the Internal Revenue
Code applied nationally:
To obviate any possible confusion the court is not to be
misunderstood as laying down a special rule for schools
31

Id. at 1164-65.
Id. at 1170-71.
33 Id.
32

8

located in Mississippi. The underlying principle is broader,
and is applicable to schools outside Mississippi with the
same or similar badge of doubt. 34
On appeal, Green was affirmed (albeit summarily) by the
Supreme Court. 35 Green was also cited in four decisions of U.S.
Courts of Appeals, upholding IRS authority to deny exemptions to
racially discriminatory schools. 36 In addition, Congress appears to
have ratified the Green decision in 1976 by explicitly amending the
Code to deny tax-exempt status to social clubs that discriminate on
the basis of race. 37 By prohibiting exemptions to segregated social
clubs, Congress signaled its understanding that exemptions for
segregated schools already were disallowed. 38 Both House and
Senate reports specifically cited Green as establishing that
"discrimination on account of race is inconsistent with an educational
institution's tax-exempt status." 39
The Green principle—construing the IRC to prohibit the grant of
exempt status to whites only private schools—has been subject to
only one significant and, as it turned out, short-lived challenge since
1970. Late in the afternoon of Friday, January 8, 1982, the Reagan
administration made two startling announcements. 40 First, the Internal

34

Id. at 1174.
404 U.S. 997 (1971), sub nom. Coit v. Green.
36 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980); Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc,
v. United States, No. 80-1473 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1981); Prince Edward Sch. Found. v. United
States, No. 79-1622 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1980); Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
37 Pub. L. No. 94-568, 90 Stat. 2697 (1976).
38 Congress added Section 501(i) to reverse a judicial decision that upheld tax exemptions for
these groups in McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
39 S. Rep. No. 1318, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-8 & n.5 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1353, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 8 & n.5 (1976).
40 U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, "Treasury Establishes New Tax-Exempt
Policy," Jan. 8, 1982, reprinted in Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax
35

9

Revenue Service, reversing an eleven-year-old policy, said it would
henceforth grant tax exemptions to segregated private schools,
because, in the view of the Reagan administration, the IRS had no
legal authority to deny them. Second, the government asked the
Supreme Court to vacate, as "moot," Bob Jones University v. United
States41 and Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 42 two
cases

in

which

racially discriminatory private

schools

were

challenging prior denials of tax-exempt status. 43
After

critical

public

reaction,

44

however,

the

Reagan

administration swiftly backed off and changed course. It said that it
favored and would submit to Congress legislation to authorize the
IRS to deny exemptions to private schools that discriminate. 45
Pending congressional action, moreover, the IRS would continue to
deny them in all such cases, save for Bob Jones and Goldsboro, to
which exempt status would be restored. 46 Five weeks later, the D.C.
Circuit enjoined the IRS from granting exemptions to any segregated
school, including Bob Jones and Goldsboro. 47 The government then

Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearing Before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 607-08 (1982) [hereinafter “Policy Change Hearings”].
41 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
42 No. 80-1473 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1981).
43 Memorandum for the United States, reprinted in Policy Change Hearings, supra note 40, at
612-14.
44 See Wolfman, Law, Cut on a Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1982, at A27; Kraft, A Con Job, W ASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 1982, at A19; Lewis, Shucks, It's Only the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1982, at A23;
Pirouetting on Civil Rights, TIME, Jan. 25, 1982, at 24.
45 White House Press Release, "Statement by the President," Jan. 12, 1982, reprinted in Policy
Change Hearings, supra note 40, at 620.
46 Weisman, Reagan Acts to Bar Tax Break to Schools in Racial Bias Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
1982, at A1.
47 Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982).
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withdrew the "suggestion of mootness" in the two Supreme Court
cases,48 and oral argument occurred later that fall.
The Supreme Court issued its near unanimous decision a few
months later. In Bob Jones University v. United States, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for an 8-1 majority held, as did the earlier three-judge
panel in Green, that the Internal Revenue Code must be construed to
prohibit the denial of exempt status to racially segregated private
schools.49 The lone dissenter was Justice William Rhenquist.
When all these actions are put together—the Supreme Court’s
affirmance of the Green decision, congressional endorsement of
Green through the legislative denial of tax-exempt status to
segregated social clubs, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bob
Jones—the Green principle appeared firmly entrenched.
C. Lax Enforcement
Despite the ringing affirmation of the Green principle—that
exempt status must be withheld from racially discriminatory private
schools—enforcement of that principle in practice was lax. In the
thirteen-year period, following the first order in Green and preceding
then Judge Ginsburg’s opinion in Wright v. Regan, tax-exempt status
was withheld from only 111 schools that enrolled probably no more
than 50,000 students. 50
The Southern Regional Council (an organization of Southern
business, labor, religious, and professional leaders interested in race
48

Taylor, Schools Tax Issue Put to High Court in Shift by Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1982, at
A1.
49 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
50 Taylor, U.S. Drops Rule on Tax Penalty for Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1982, at A1. The
average segregated school was estimated to enroll 200 students. See generally supra note 7
(citing sources). Even if that estimate is doubled, the 111 schools denied exemptions would be
expected to enroll no more than 50,000 students.
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relations) estimated that in 1970 about 400,000 whites were attending
segregated schools and that by 1972 this figure had grown to
535,000.

51

One organization of private schools, affiliated with

segregationist white citizen councils, reported its 1971 membership
as including 396 academies with 176,000 students. 52 In 1978, the
U.S. Civil Rights Commission counted 3,500 schools that were
created or substantially expanded at the time of local school
desegregation. 53 (All 3,500 may not have discriminated, but it was
reasonable to assume that a substantial proportion did, given the
propinquity in time of the schools' creation or expansion to
desegregation efforts.) Perhaps the most pointed evidence of
nonenforcement was that a number of private schools adjudged by
federal courts to be discriminatory, and therefore ineligible for direct
aid to education, continued to enjoy federal income-tax exemptions.54
While there was no consensus as to the total number of segregated
private schools, even the lowest estimate indicated that only a tiny
fraction was denied exemption.
The gap between principle and practice resulted from
implementing procedures, under which a school obtained a taxexemption merely by declaring that it did not discriminate. Once the
required

declaration

was

made,

the

school

was

presumed

nondiscriminatory, and the presumption was rarely challenged.

51

Terjen, supra note 7, at 50.
Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1448 (1973).
53 Implementation Hearings, supra note 9 at 479 (statement of E. Richard Larson).
54 Id. at 5 (statement of Jerome Kurtz); Staff of Subcommittee on Oversight of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, Report on IRS's Proposed Revenue Procedure Regarding the
Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 40 & nn.3-4 (Committee Print
1979) [hereinafter “Staff Report”].
52

12

The first enforcement guidelines, 55 contained in the July 1970
IRS press release, accepted the Green principle but made
declaration of nondiscrimination easy. Tax exemptions would be
"available to private schools announcing racially nondiscriminatory
admissions policies," and "in most instances evidence of a
nondiscriminatory policy can be supplied by reference to published
statements of policy." 56 The manner of publication was left to the
school's discretion.
The permanent injunction issued in Green in 1971 specified
that Mississippi schools were to include the policy statement in all
brochures, catalogues, and printed advertising and to "bring it to the
attention of . . . minority groups." 57 In response, the IRS formally
announced nationwide publicity standards in 1972. Revenue
Procedure 72-54 listed acceptable methods, in the alternative, as: 1)
publication in a "newspaper of general circulation that serves all racial
segments of the locality"; 2) "broadcast media" that reach "all
segments of the community the school serves"; 3) "school brochures
and catalogues" if "distributed . . . to all segments of the community
that the school serves"; or 4) advising "leaders of racial minorities . . .
so that they in turn will make this policy known to other members of
their race." 58
After the U.S. Civil Rights Commission challenged the
adequacy of these standards, 59 the IRS adopted somewhat more
55

The temporary Green order, issued the previous January, offered no guidance on
implementation. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
56 IRS News Releases, supra note 24, ¶¶ 6790, 6814.
57 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (D.D.C. 1971).
58 1972-2 C.B. 834.
59 Implementation Hearings, supra note 9, at 4 (statement of Jerome Kurtz).
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stringent guidelines in 1975. Revenue Procedure 75-50 sets out three
basic

requirements,

all

of

which

must

be

met.

First,

the

nondiscrimination policy must be stated in the school's charter or bylaws, in all brochures and catalogues, and all written advertising.
Second, the policy has to be publicized either in a "newspaper" or
through the "broadcast media." Third, the publicity has to occur
"during the period of . . . solicitation for students . . . during the
school's registration period." 60 The 1975 guidelines remain in effect
today.
These four approaches—the 1970 IRS press release, the 1971
Green injunction, the 1972 Revenue Procedure, and the 1975
Revenue Procedure—assumed that a mere declaration of policy was
adequate to enforce the Green principle. Yet according to the U.S.
Civil Rights Commission, the Justice Department under Presidents
Ford and Carter, and a congressional study, even the heavier burden
of publication imposed in 1975 was easily met by schools that in fact
practiced racial discrimination. 61 Most simply declared that they did
not discriminate and thus obtained exemptions. 62 Only the handful
60

1975-2 C.B. 587-88. The second requirement of publicity through the mass media is, however,
relaxed for three kinds of schools. A church-related school drawing at least 75% of its students
from the sponsoring religious denomination may announce its anti- discrimination policy in a
church newspaper. A school drawing a substantial percentage of students from a large
geographical area may demonstrate reasonable efforts to inform students of its policy. A school
with a meaningful number of minority students is entirely exempt. Id. at 588-89.
61 The positions of the Civil Rights Commission, the Ford Justice Department, and the Carter
Justice Department are reported in Implementation Hearings, supra note 9, at 221-35, 237-51,
1175-87. A staff report expressed general agreement with their conclusions, Staff Report, supra
note 54, at 21.
62 According to Rep. Sam Gibbons:
Not surprisingly, this [has] proved inadequate. It was a bit like asking the average
American taxpayer to simply mail in a check for his taxes, along with an
affirmation that the amount enclosed was correct, without requiring any specific
figures or documentation.
Implementation Hearings, supra note 9, at 1.

14

that openly acknowledged their discriminatory practices lost exempt
status.
In 1976, the IRS was sued for stricter enforcement of the Green
principle: in Mississippi by the reopening of Green and in the other 49
states by the filing of Wright v. Regan, a class action on behalf of
parents of black schoolchildren nationwide.

63

Both suits were

consolidated, but the proceedings were suspended in 1978, when the
IRS published its own proposal for stricter enforcement. 64 The
proposal was derived from criteria developed by federal district courts
for identifying segregated private schools ineligible for state textbook
aid.65
The new IRS enforcement proposal focused not on self-serving
declarations but on two objective factors: the propinquity in time of a
private

school's

formation

or

expansion

to

public

school

desegregation, and the private school's proportion of minority
enrollment. Any private school formed or substantially expanded at
the time of local public school desegregation would be presumed
discriminatory unless its minority enrollment was at least 20 percent
of the proportion of minorities in the local community's school age
population.66 The presumption could be rebutted only by engaging in
four of five specified practices designed to attract minority students
and faculty. 67

63

The case was originally docketed as Wright v. Simon, No. 76-1426 (D.D.C. July 30, 1976).
Proposed Rev. Proc., 43 Fed. Reg. 37296 (1978).
65 Brumfield v. Dodd, 425 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. La. 1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 382 F. Supp. 921
(D. Miss. 1974).
66 Proposed Rev. Proc., supra note 64, § 3.03.
67 Id. § 4.02.
64
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Public reaction to the 1978 proposal was overwhelmingly
negative. The IRS received over 150,000 letters, virtually all in
opposition, and the public was invited to comment during three days
of hearings at the IRS national office. 68 As a result of the criticism, the
proposal was made substantially less rigid and was republished in
1979.69 Under the revised proposal, the presumption of discrimination
would arise only if minority enrollment was "insignificant" (in addition
to the school being founded or expanded at the time of local public
school desegregation), and rebuttal of an unfavorable presumption
was made considerably easier. 70 These changes, however, were not
sufficient to overcome the negative public reaction. 71
After hearings in the House and Senate on the revised
proposal, 72 Congress froze enforcement in the mold of the 1975
Revenue Procedure by attaching two riders to the Treasury
Appropriations

Bill

for

1980. One,

the Dornan amendment,

specifically denied funds for enforcement of either the original 1978
proposal or the 1979 revision. 73 The other, the Ashbrook amendment,
prohibited the use of appropriated funds to enforce any Treasury or
IRS guidelines not in effect before August 22, 1978 (the date on
which the IRS published its 1978 enforcement proposal). 74 Both the

68

Staff Report, supra note 54, at 40.
Proposed Rev. Proc., supra note 64.
70 Id.
71 See Implementation Hearings, supra note 9; Staff Report, supra note 54, at 1-8.
72 Implementation Hearings, supra note 9; Staff Report, supra note 54, at 1-8; Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Committee on
Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
73 Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 9674, § 615, 93 Stat. 559, 577 (1979).
74 Id. § 103, 93 Stat. at 5-62.
69
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Dornan and Ashbrook amendments continued in effect for several
subsequent fiscal years. 75
These congressional efforts undermined the IRS attempt to
strengthen its enforcement rules. As a result of the Ashbrook and
Dornan amendments, the ineffective enforcement protocol of the
1975 Revenue Procedure remained the only vehicle for implementing
the principle of Green.76
II. Litigation Resumes: The Strengthened Green Order and
Wright v. Regan
A. The District Court
In 1979, following passage of the Ashbrook and Dornan
amendments, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights reopened the
suspended proceedings in Green and Wright, seeking a court order
of more vigorous enforcement of the Green principle. In November,
District Court Judge Hart dismissed the Wright component on
jurisdictional grounds,77 primarily because the plaintiffs were held to
lack standing under the 1975 Supreme Court opinion in Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization (EKWRO). 78

75

The restrictions remained in force during the 1981 and 1982 fiscal years because Treasury
funds were provided through continuing resolutions, which automatically carried through any
restrictions on appropriations enacted in the previous fiscal year. Continuing Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-369, 94 Stat. 1351 (1980); Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-536, 94 Stat. 3166 (1980); Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-51, 95 Stat. 958 (1981); Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-85, 95 Stat. 1098 (1981); Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-92, 95 Stat. 1183 (1981).
76 The two riders did not alter either the Green construction of the Internal Revenue Code or the
existing requirement that exempt private schools announce a nondiscrimination policy. The
sponsors stated that their purpose was only to prevent implementation of the new enforcement
rules. Thus, neither bill prohibited the spending of appropriated funds to enforce the 1975
Revenue Procedure. Policy Change Hearings, supra note 40, at 691-92, 701.
77 The case was then docketed as Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979).
78 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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In EKWRO, indigent plaintiffs challenged a Revenue Ruling
permitting a hospital, to receive tax-exempt status regardless of
whether it provided free or below cost service to the poor. The
plaintiffs lacked standing, the Supreme Court declared, because it “is
purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the
complaint fairly can be traced to (the Ruling) or instead result from
decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax
implications.”

79

Similarly, in the Wright litigation, Judge Hart

concluded, it was purely speculative whether racial discrimination by
segregated private schools could be traced to IRS enforcement
practices or resulted from decisions made by the schools without
regard to taxes.
Judge Hart, however, rejected an identical argument with
respect to the Green component, because standing had already been
found by the original three-judge panel in 1970. 80 After trial on the
merits, in May 1980, Judge Hart granted the kind of substantive relief
requested by the Green plaintiffs by ordering stricter enforcement. He
enjoined the IRS from granting exempt status to Mississippi schools
that were "established or expanded at the time of local school
desegregation,

unless

the

schools

clearly

and

convincingly

demonstrate that they do not discriminate." 81
In July 1980, following Judge Hart’s order in the Mississippi
litigation, Congress acted to prevent the IRS from denying
exemptions to private schools under his strengthened Green
injunction or any other future judicial rules. It expanded the Ashbrook
79

Id. at 42-43.
480 F. Supp. at 793 n.1.
81 Green v. Miller, No. 1355-69 (D.D.C. May 5, 1980), amended, June 2, 1980.
80
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rider, which already banned spending to enforce any rule made by
the Executive after August 22, 1978, to include in addition "any . . .
court order." 82 Meanwhile, during this same period, the dismissal of
Wright was on appeal to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia.
B. The Appeal: Judge Ginsburg’s Opinion
In June 1981, the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge
Ginsburg, reversed Judge Hart and ruled that the Wright plaintiffs did
have standing. 83 Her opinion began by reviewing in detail the history
of both the Green and Wright litigation. 84

She emphasized “the

anomalous result” of the district court decision.85 To obey both court
decree and congressional stop order, the Service must apply one set
of guidelines to schools in Mississippi and another, less stringent set
of procedures to schools outside Mississippi, even schools bearing
‘the same or similar badge of doubt.’ ”86
Acknowledging that the 1975 Supreme Court opinion in
EKWRO stands for the proposition that "litigation concerning tax
liability is a matter between taxpayer and IRS, with the door barely
ajar for third party challenges,"

87

Judge Ginsburg cited other

Supreme Court precedents pointing in the opposite direction,
affirming that parents of black schoolchildren do have standing to
challenge government assistance to private schools practicing race
discrimination. In particular, Judge Ginsburg noted that in the

82

Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-51, supra note 64.
656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
84 Id. at 823-825.
85 Id. at 826.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 828.
83
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companion Green litigation, Norwood v. Harrison, 88 and Gilmore v.
City of Montgomery,89 the Supreme Court upheld the standing of the
plaintiffs to challenge government conduct as “inconsistent with an
overriding, constitutionally rooted national policy against racial
discrimination in United States educational facilities.” 90
In Norwood v. Harrison, parents of black schoolchildren
challenged aid to segregated private schools under a Mississippi
program begun in 1940, which furnished free textbooks for students
at all public and private elementary and secondary schools in the
state. 91 In a unanimous decision, the Justices found for the parents
and ordered the Federal District Court in Mississippi to establish
procedures for identifying private schools that were racially
discriminatory and therefore ineligible for free textbooks. 92
One year later, in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, parents of
black students sought an injunction against "the use of city owned
and operated recreational facilities by any private school group . . .
which is racially segregated." 93 Citing Norwood, the Supreme Court
again unanimously affirmed an order against the exclusive use of
certain facilities, because that constituted "tangible state assistance
outside generalized services . . . . " 94

88

413 U.S. 455 (1973).
417 U.S. 556 (1974).
90 656 F.2d at 829.
91 413 U.S. at 457.
92 Id. at 471.
93 417 U.S. at 556.
94 Id. at 568. The proceedings were remanded to the District Court for findings as to whether the
nonexclusive "use of zoos, museums, parks, and other recreational facilities by private school
groups in common with others . . . involves the government so directly as to violate the equal
protection clause." Id. at 570. Four Justices would have declared unconstitutional, without
remand, the nonexclusive use of facilities, such as athletic fields, that relieve [the schools] of the
89
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Given these precedents, Judge Ginsburg concluded:
Green, Norwood, and Gilmore presented plaintiffs whose
standing seems to us indistinguishable on any principled
ground from the standing of the plaintiffs in this action. If
the plaintiffs before us are not entitled to question the IRS
practices at issue here, it is difficult to comprehend why
the Green, Norwood, and Gilmore plaintiffs were entitled
to challenge the tax exemptions, textbook loans, and
specially reserved park facilities at issue in those cases. 95

Thus, Judge Ginsburg’s

opinion in Wright

provided a

persuasive defense of the right of parents of back schoolchildren to
challenge the provision of government assistance, include tax-exempt
status, to racially segregated private schools.

She affirmed the

Green principle that “seg academies” may not receive tax-exempt
status.

She offered an important vehicle, litigation by private

individuals, for curing the woeful underenforcement of Green when
more vigorous implementation was blocked by congressional
enactment of the Ashbrook and Dornan amendments.
C. The Supreme Court Reverses
In 1984, three years later, a 5-3 Supreme Court majority
reversed Judge Ginsburg’s decision on grounds similar to those cited
by Judge Hart. 96 The opinion of the Court by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor stated:
expense of maintaining their own facilities" or are used "for events that are part of the school
curriculum." Id. at 576-82.
95 656 F.2d at 828.
96 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
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The diminished ability of respondents' children to receive
a desegregated education would be fairly traceable to
unlawful IRS grants of tax exemptions only if there were
enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving
tax

exemptions

in

respondents'

communities

for

withdrawal of those exemptions to make an appreciable
difference in public school integration. Respondents have
made no such allegation. It is, first, uncertain how many
racially discriminatory private schools are in fact receiving
tax exemptions. Moreover, it is entirely speculative . . .
whether withdrawal of a tax-exemption from any particular
school would lead the school to change its policies. 97

Thus, Justice O’Connor concluded:
The links in the chain of causation between the
challenged Government conduct and the asserted injury
are far too weak for the chain as a whole to sustain
respondents' standing. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org. . . . the Court held that standing to
challenge a Government grant of a tax-exemption to
hospitals could not be founded on the asserted
connection between the grant of tax-exempt status and
the hospitals' policy concerning the provision of medical
services to indigents. 98

97
98

Id. at 758.
Id. at 759.
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Justice

William

Brennan,

endorsing

Judge

Ginsburg’s

reasoning, issued a stinging dissent:
Once again, the Court “uses ‘standing to slam the
courthouse door against plaintiffs who are entitled to full
consideration of their claims on the merits.’ ” 99
[T]he Court displays a startling insensitivity to the
historical role played by the federal courts in eradicating
race discrimination from our Nation's schools—a role that
has played a prominent part in this Court's decisions from
Brown v. Board of Education . . . . 100
Moreover, Justice Brennan continued, the allegations in the
complaint were more than sufficient to satisfy standing requirements:
[T]he

respondents

relationship

between

have

alleged

the

a

direct

Government

action

causal
they

challenge and the injury they suffer: their inability to
receive an education in a racially integrated school is
directly and adversely affected by the tax-exempt status
granted by the IRS to racially discriminatory schools in
their respective school districts. Common sense alone
would recognize that the elimination of tax-exempt status
for racially discriminatory private schools would serve to
lessen the impact that those institutions have in defeating
efforts to desegregate the public schools. 101
Justice Stevens, whose separate dissent was joined by Justice
Blackmun, also emphasized the majority’s “untenable assumption
99

Id. at 766.
Id. at 767.
101 Id. at 774.
100
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that the granting of preferential tax treatment to segregated schools
does not make those schools more attractive to white students and
hence does not inhibit the process of desegregation.”102
III. The Legacy of Wright
A. Segregated Private Schools Since the Supreme Court
Decision
During the 30-years since the 1984 Supreme Courts’ decision
in Wright, there have been numerous studies of the de facto
resegregation of America’s public school systems but surprisingly no
systematic examination of the contribution of private segregated
education to his phenomenon. What evidence exists is anecdotal.
For example, in 2002, the Birmingham News reported on the
Wilcox Academy in rural Alabama as “100 percent white, a typical link
in the chain of private Black Belt academies erected in the late 1960s
and 1970s to circumvent federal integration orders.”103 However, the
newspaper also noted, “The chain is weakening by the year. Beset
with dwindling enrollments, internal conflicts and an inability to pay
teachers' salaries, so-called ‘seg academies’ close down regularly in
this rural stretch of central Alabama.” 104
There are reports, however, that all-white private academies in
the South continue to receive federal tax-exempt status, even in
Mississippi, where Judge Hart’s strengthened enforcement order may
have had little or no effect. In 2012, an article in the Atlantic magazine
described one such school in Indianola, Mississippi, that continues to
102

Id. at 795.
Crowder, Private White Academies Struggle in Changing World, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 27,
2002, available at http://www.al.com/specialreport/birminghamnews/?blackbelt16.html.
104 Id.
103
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benefit from federal tax-exempt status. 105 The Atlantic also claimed
that at least 35 such schools continue to operate in the Mississippi
Delta.106
B. Echoes of Wright v. Regan in the Virginia Military
Institute Case.
There were echoes of Wright v. Regan in the much later 1996
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Virginia 107 (VMI) for which
Justice Ginsburg also wrote the opinion of the Court. In Wright, Judge
Ginsburg expressed serious doubt that the equal protection clause of
the Constitution permits the federal government to grant tax-exempt
status to racially segregated private schools. In VMI, Justice Ginsburg
held that the equal protection clause does not permit the state to
finance a military college, the Virginia Military Institute, open only to
male applicants.
It was of course direct state funding rather than tax-exempt
status that raised the equal protection issue in ViMI. Nevertheless,
during oral argument counsel for the state argued that if the
Constitution requires a military college financed and controlled by the
state of Virginia to admit women, then it also requires Wellesley
College to admit men or lose its federal tax-exempt status. 108
Similarly, in dissenting from the Court's decision in VMI, Justice
Scalia wrote: "[I]t is certainly not beyond the Court that rendered
today's decision to hold that a [tax deductible] donation to a
105

Carr, In Southern Towns, “Segregation Academies” are Still Going Strong, ATLANTIC, Dec. 13,
2012,
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/12/in-southern-townssegregation-academies-are-still-going-strong/266207/.
106 Id.
107 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
108 id., Transcript of Oral Argument at 45.
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single-sex college should be deemed contrary to public policy and
therefore not deductible if the college discriminates on the basis of
sex." 109
Notwithstanding the conclusion that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit exempt status for racially segregated private
schools, and notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in VMI,
can exempt status be constitutionally provided to single-sex private
educational institutions? The constitutional status of whites-only
private schools is vastly different from that of single-sex educational
institutions. Although in Bob Jones, the Supreme Court cited the
"unmistakably clear" agreement among "all three branches of the
Federal Government" that racial discrimination must be eliminated, 110
there is no evidence of a similar hostility to single-sex educational
institutions. Thus, an amicus brief in the VMI case contrasted racially
segregated education with single-sex education to counter the
suggestion that if a military college financed by, and subject to the
control of, the state of Virginia is required to admit female applicants,
then Wellesley College must admit men or lose its federal tax-exempt
status:
The three branches of the federal government have not,
acting independently or in concert, articulated a position
against, much less launched a crusade to dismantle,
private single-sex colleges . . . . In short, there is no
"fundamental public policy" or "declared position of the
whole
109
110

Government"

which

the

518 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598 (1983).
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maintenance

or

establishment of private single-gender undergraduate
college programs contravenes . . . . Moreover . . . the
evidence is clear and well-established that single-sex
education for women is particularly effective in preparing
them for leadership and success, generally, and in
male-dominated fields, more particularly. 111
As Justice Ginsburg noted in VMI, the Supreme Court has
"reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on
race or national origin . . . ."112 In addition, there is a vast difference
between the kind of support afforded the Virginia Military Institute—
the college was largely financed and controlled by the state of
Virginia—and the less extensive and intrusive support afforded by
tax-exempt status. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in VMI noted the
special circumstances of the case, addressing "specifically and only
an educational opportunity recognized . . . as 'unique,' . . . an
opportunity available only at Virginia's premier military institute, the
Commonwealth's sole single-sex public university or college." 113
In the absence of special circumstances, however, the Equal
Protection Clause Fourteenth Amendment should permit an all-men's
(as well as an all-women's) college to benefit from tax-exempt status,
even though more intrusive government financing and control of the
kind in the VMI case would raise equal protection issues and despite
the fact that racially segregated private schools should ordinarily not
be permitted to receive exempt status given the especially high
111

Brief for Twenty Six Private Women's Colleges as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, VMI,
518 U.S. 515, 1995 WL 702837, at *23, *25.
112 VMI, 518 U.S. at 532 n.6.
113 Id. at 533 n.7.
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constitutional value placed on ending racial discrimination in
education.
Judge

Ginsburg’s

consideration

of

Wright—where

the

underlying issue involved the strict scrutiny of racial classifications
under

the equal protection clause—may have influenced Justice

Ginsburg’s articulation of

the intermediate

scrutiny

of gender

classifications in cases like VMI. Indeed, together VMI and Wright
present

an

integrated

and

balanced

protection challenges that considers
and

gender

government

discrimination and
assistance.

Thus,

approach

to

equal

differences between race
between

tax-exempt

different kinds of
status

for

racially

segregated private schools would be constitutionally suspect while
tax-exempt status for an all male institution presumably would not.
Of course, depending on the context and the myriad different
ways that single-sex education might be implemented, it is
conceivable that in special circumstances, tax-exempt status for
single-sex private education might offend the Equal Protection Clause.
Justice Ginsburg’s tax expert husband, Prof. Martin G. Ginsburg,
suggested one such circumstance over thirty years ago in 1977. 114
The IRS had ruled that a charitable deduction was available for
contributions to a males-only college scholarship for graduates of a
coeducational high school.

115

Prof. Ginsburg conceded that

contributions to a scholarship for students at a single-sex institution
could be deductible.

He forcefully argued, however, that the IRS

114

Husband of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg for 56 years until his death in 2010, Prof. Martin
David Ginsburg was an internationally renowned tax expert and probably the greatest authority
ever on the law of corporate taxation.
115 TAM 7744007, 1977 WL 50659
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ruling on a males-only scholarship at a coeducational institution was
inconsistent with applicable federal law, Supreme Court precedents,
and possibly even the Constitution. 116

[T]he Supreme Court has declared invidiously
discriminatory gender-based classifications that denigrate
women

or

deny

them

equal

opportunity.

Such

classification . . . is inconsistent with the equal protection
requirement of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The
decade's precedent solidly establishes an elevated review
standard for gender-based allocation of benefits or
opportunities. A "legitimate" objective will not save a sex
classification; a "rational" means/end relationship will not
suffice. In the Court's words: "To withstand [constitutional]
scrutiny . . . classifications by gender must serve
important

governmental

objectives

and

must

be

substantially related to those objectives." 117
Strongest condemnation has been expressed by the
Court for the gender criterion used to preserve for males
special advantage in "the marketplace and the world of
ideas."

Distinguishing

"between

[boy and

girl]

on

educational grounds," the Court has emphasized, is "selfserving" and "coincides with the role typing society has
long imposed."118
116 Martin Ginsburg, Sex Discrimination and the IRS: Public Policy and the Charitable Deduction,
10 TAX NOTES 27 (Jan. 14, 1980).
117 Id.
118 Id.
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APPENDIX
THE DEDUCTION FOR CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION: FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE OR AN INCOME-DEFINING PROVISION?
Judge Ginsburg’s opinion in Wright v. Regan assumes that a
deduction for charitable contributions to racially segregated private schools
constitutes financial assistance, analogous to a direct grant of funds from
the federal government. A number of tax theorists have argued, however,
that the charitable deduction should not be regarded as if it were a direct
grant because it is consistent with measuring income and is thus
comparable to the deduction for ordinary and necessary business
expenses that is allowed to arrive at a "true" income figure.
The income measurement view starts with the generally accepted
standard, the Haig-Simons definition:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of
(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2)
the change in value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and end of the period in question. 119
Income, in other words, equals the value of what is consumed plus
what is saved. Since donations are neither consumed nor saved by the
donor, they are not income to the donor and must be deducted from the
donor's tax base. The contributions are actually used up only by the
ultimate beneficiaries of the charity. 120
However, the donor's consumption can be defined to include the
satisfaction derived from making a charitable donation, and the value of
119

H. Simons, Personal Income Taxation, 50 (1938).
See Andrews, Personal Deductions In An Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 346 (1972);
Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants? 28 Tax L. Rev. 37, 59
(1972).
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such satisfaction might equal at least part of the value of the gift. "When
they turn their attention to charitable contributions, tax economists almost
uniformly argue that these are consumption expenditures from which the
donor gets what he pays for, viz., personal satisfaction undiminished by the
fact that the recipient also benefits from his generosity." 121 It is therefore
arguable whether a full deduction for charitable contributions is consistent
with measuring the donor's income.
Even conceding this point, it is not enough to focus solely on the
donor; the income measurement issue requires considering the tax
treatment of both donor and donee together. If the donor does not benefit
from the gift and is therefore entitled to a deduction, then logically there
should be income to the ultimate beneficiary who consumes it. Yet the
beneficiary never reports the item because Code Section 102(a) permits
donees to exclude all gifts in computing taxable income. The beneficiary's
gift exclusion combines with the donor's charitable deduction to result in the
income represented by the donation never being taxed. The nontaxation of
both donor and donee is consistent with income measurement only when
the ultimate beneficiaries of the gift are too poor to owe taxes. This
condition might be satisfied if charitable deductions today were limited to
the category of "relief of the poor"; but it is doubtful that the condition is
more than occasionally met by the ultimate beneficiaries in this case, the
students attending private schools and their parents. 122
121

B. Bittker in C. Galvin and B. Bittker, The Income Tax: How Progressive Should It Be? 53-54
(1969).
122 Cf. Bittker & Raedhert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income
Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299, 334 (1976):
[T]he students who attend exempt schools . . . probably come from higher income
classes than most of the beneficiaries of other charitable organizations . . . it weakens
one argument in favor of exempting many other nonprofit organizations – that the burden
of a tax would fall largely on persons at the bottom of the income ladder.

31

Another argument views the charitable deduction as income-defining
because it is needed to equalize the tax treatment of a donor who
contributes cash or property with a donor who makes a gift of his or her
own services. 123 Consider a doctor and a lawyer, both of whom wish to
contribute to a hospital. The doctor works five hours a week on the wards
without pay. Because his contribution takes the form of imputed income
from services, the donation is disregarded in determining his taxable
income. The lawyer contributes the fees from five hours of legal work. His
position is like the doctor's except that he donates income in nonimputed
cash form, which means that it must be reported as income. In order to
treat the lawyer the same as the doctor, an offsetting deduction for the cash
donation might be allowed. Nevertheless, as a general rule we do not
correct for differences in treatment caused by nontaxation of imputed
income. If a lawyer pays someone else to write a will or a baker buys
another's cakes, no deduction is allowed for the expenditure even though
each might have consumed his own services and thereby realized no
taxable income.
The income measurement view also appears at odds with the general
rule (to which the charitable deduction is a clear exception) that ordinary
gifts may not be deducted. 124 Why do gifts to the Red Cross and Yale

See also Andrews, supra note 98, at 356-57:
Many contributions are to private schools, whose student bodies are probably still
disproportionately representative of the affluent part of the population.
123 See Andrews, supra note 98, at 352-4; and Bittker, supra note 98, at 59-60. 9-60.
124 Congress appears to have consistently regarded the charitable deduction as a subsidy rather
than an income measurement provision. For example, in 1938 when foreign charities were
excluded from the category of eligible donees, the House Ways and Means Committee explained:
The [deduction] is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated
for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise
have to be met by appropriations from public funds . . . . The United States
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University reduce the donor's Haig-Simons income, but not gifts to the
Committee to Reelect the President or a favorite nephew? Gifts to ordinary
donees are, in the same sense, neither saved nor consumed by the donor.
And the general rule is not considered to cause overtaxation even if the
donor is in a higher tax bracket than the donee or if a disparity exists vis-avis donors who make gifts of imputed income.
The critical problem for proponents of the income measurement view
is to justify special treatment for charitable gifts when ordinary gifts are not
deductible. They appear to rely primarily on the idea that gifts to charity,
unlike gifts to relatives or friends that finance private consumption, satisfy a
moral obligation or provide desirable public goods:
[C]haritable contributions represent a [moral] claim of
such a high priority that . . . a case can be made for excluding
them in determining the amount of income at the voluntary
disposal of the taxpayer in question . . . . Side by side with
taxpayers who can satisfy their charitable impulse by making a
contribution of their time . . . are others who feel the same
charitable impulse, but, must discharge their moral obligation by
contributing cash or property. 125

Almost all charitable organizations other than those that
distribute alms to the poor produce something in the nature of
common or social goods or services. The benefit produced by a
derives no such benefit from gifts to foreign institutions, and the proposed
limitation is consistent with the above theory.
H. R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 (part 2) C. B. 728, 742. If
Congress had believed in the income measurement theory, then logically foreign donees would
not be treated differently.
125 Bittker, supra note 98, at 59-60.
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contribution to a private school, for example . . . . [T]he product
is essentially a common good . . . . [T]he ultimate benefits from
schooling flow beyond the immediate recipients.
General education makes better citizens . . . .

126

In the end, whether or not we consider the charitable deduction
generally to be an income measurement provision depends on a whole
range of value judgments, all of which are debatable. This uncertainty
reflects the fact that the generally accepted standard for income
measurement -- the Haig-Simons rule -- lacks precision and does not
always provide clear or easy answers. The inexactness of the standard has
been used to criticize the view of the charitable deduction as equivalent to
a direct grant in other contexts, such as devising a comprehensive tax base
or compiling a tax expenditure budget. 127 Nevertheless, unless segregated
education is deemed to serve a moral goal or provide a desirable public
good, then a critical premise of the income measurement view (that may be
appropriate in other contexts) is not valid in this specific case.
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Andrews, supra note 98, at 357, 359; cf. Bittker, supra note 98:
[T]he deduction can be viewed as a mechanism for permitting the taxpayer to
direct . . . the social functions to be supported by his tax payments . . . . [T]he
deduction gives the taxpayer a chance to divert funds which would otherwise be
spent as Washington determines and to allocate them to other socially approved
functions.
Id. at 60-61.
127 See generally Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 925 (1967); Bittker, Accounting for Federal Tax Subsidies in the National Budget,
22 Nat'l Tax J. 244 (1969).
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